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Abstract: Over the past several months, the outbreak of COVID-19 has been expanding over the world. A
reliable and accurate dataset of the cases is vital for scientists to conduct related research and for policy-
makers to make better decisions. We collect the COVID-19 daily reported data from four open sources: the
New York Times, the COVID-19 Data Repository by Johns Hopkins University, the COVID Tracking Project
at the Atlantic, and the USAFacts, and compare the similarities and differences among them. In addition, we
examine the following problems which occur frequently: (1) the order dependencies violation, (2) outliers
and abnormal observations, and (3) the delay-reported issue on weekends and/or holidays. We also integrate
the COVID-19 reported cases with the county-level auxiliary information of the local features from official
sources, such as health infrastructure, demographic, socioeconomic, and environment information, which are
important for understanding the spread of the virus.
Key words and phrases: Coronavirus; Dynamic models in epidemics; Nonparametric modeling; Prediction;
Spatial epidemiology; Varying coefficient models.
1 Background & Summary
Since the first infected case reported in December 2019, the outbreak of COVID-19 has unfolded across
the globe. In the U.S., coronavirus has infected more than 1.7 million people and killed over 100,000
people, as of the time of writing. While essential public health, economic and social science research
in measuring and modeling COVID-19 and its effects is underway, reliable and accurate datasets are
vital for scientists to conduct related research and for governments to make better decisions (Killeen
et al., 2020). Unfortunately, errors could occur in the data collection process, especially under such a
pandemic. In this work, we focus on the data collection, comparison, data inconsistency detection, and
the corresponding curating.
Living through unprecedented times, governments must rely on timely, reliable data to make deci-
sions to mitigate harm and support their citizens. Every day, several volunteer groups and organizations
work very hard on collecting data on COVID-19 from all the counties and states in the U.S. There are
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2four major sources, including (1) the New York Times (NYT, 2020a), (2) the COVID Tracking Project
at the Atlantic (Atlantic) (Atlantic, 2020), (3) the data repository by the Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) (CSSE, 2020), and (4) USAFact (USAFacts,
2020). Although these sources usually obtain their confirmed infectious and death cases data from the
government agencies, the counts still vary due to the time of their collection as well as several other
issues. However, these differences can be critical for real-time analysis. In this work, we first collect
and compare the COVID-19 daily reported data from the above four open resources.
The COVID-19 data poses unique data quality challenges due to its spatiotemporal nature, and the
problem of delayed-reporting and under-reporting. After the detection of abnormal data, we explore
various methods to detect and repair the problematic data. To be more specific, the entire data cleaning
procedure has been divided into two categories: (1) manual cleaning, and (2) automatic cleaning. On
the one hand, manual cleaning has very high accuracy; on the other hand, it is challenging to implement
due to the high cost in time and effort.
Furthermore, it has been observed that the local characteristics, such as socioeconomic inequity,
may also contribute to the spread of epidemic (Ahmed et al., 2020; Silver, 2020). For example, the
intrinsic local community characteristics might influence and shape the spread of COVID-19, such as
demographics, endemic infections, and environmental conditions. Census data availability thus leads us
to model the infections, deaths, and recoveries accounting for all the epidemic data, control measures,
and local information. To facilitate research in identifying the significant factors that affect the disease
spread pattern and predict future infections, we also collect and combine local auxiliary information at
the county level in the U.S. from reliable sources.
To help users better visualize the epidemic data, we developed multiple R shiny apps embedded
into a COVID-19 dashboard launched on March 27, 2020. Currently, we provide both infectious and
death maps and time series of the U.S. Moreover, we provide a short-term (7-day) forecast (Wang et al.,
2020a) (updated daily) and a long-term (2-month) projection (Wang et al., 2020b) (updated weekly)
of the COVID-19 infected and death count at both the county level and state level. For public usage,
we have established a Github repository at https://github.com/covid19-dashboard-us/
cdcar. Under this repository, a daily updated and cleaned data dating from January 22, 2020, is
available. We also provide an R package cdcar for abnormal data detection and repairing.
2 Methods
2.1 Raw Data
Thanks to the contribution of the data science community across the world, multiple sources are pro-
viding different precision and focus of the COVID-19 data. In our article, we consider the reported
cases from the following four sources: the NYT (NYT, 2020a), the Atlantic (Atlantic, 2020), the JHU
3(CSSE, 2020), and the USAFacts (USAFacts, 2020). The NYT releases daily data at the country, state,
and county levels at noon of the following day. The Atlantic releases daily state-level data along with
testing, hospitalization, and recovered information, updated every afternoon. The COVID-19 Data
Repository by the CSSE at JHU provides both state and county-level data daily, updated every night.
USAFacts updates county-level data daily in early morning of the following day. Table 1 summarizes
the differences among the four sources of data based on how the data are collected and compiled. For
the cleaned data on the proposed repository, we first fetch data from the above four sources and compile
them into the same format for further comparison and cross-validation. Then, we detect the anomalies
in the data sources and choose the one with the least abnormalities to repair.
Table 1: A summary of the comparison among four sources.
Source NYT Atlantic JHU USAFacts
Infected & death∗ 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3
Recovered 0 1,2 1 0
Tested 0 1,2 2 0
Hospitalized 0 1,2 0 0
Islands∗∗ 2,3 2 2,3 0
Unallocated∗∗∗ 3 0 3 3
Place of infection# unknown r,p unknown unknown
Place of fatality r,p r,p unknown unknown
Probable infected## y y y unknown
Probable death y y y y
Note. ∗: Country Level = 1, State Level = 2, County Level = 3. USAFacts only provides county level data for
downloading. ∗∗: Whether the dataset includes Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana
Islands, Virgin Islands. ∗ ∗ ∗: Whether the dataset has unallocated/unassigned information, which is useful to
match state-level and county-level data. #: How does the dataset assigns the cases to a place. p indicates the
place of infection/fatality. r indicates the place of residence. r, p indicates both standards exist in the dataset.
##: Whether the dataset includes both confirmed and probable cases when probable data is available. y means
yes, unknown means this information is not found. NYT releases daily live data for probable and confirmed
cases separately, but historical data is unavailable.
In addition, there are two other issues, to which there is no perfect solution currently, but requires
attention from the users when they try to draw conclusive statements using the COVID-19 related data.
1. Probable versus Confirmed Cases. Excluding the population with symptoms but not confirmed
4by tests leads to the under-reporting issue of infectious counts. On April 5, 2020, the Council
of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) released an interim (Council of State and Ter-
ritorial Epidemiologists, 2020) related to the COVID-19 reporting. It requires the local or state
public health authority to submit a report of a condition to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) within 24 hours, and CDC should publish data for both “Confirmed” and
“Probable” cases in the CDC Print Criteria. Before the interim was released, most of the states
primarily reported confirmed cases. For the states and counties which started to report probable
cases, thereafter, the count of the cases would incur an unavoidable jump after including the
probable cases.
2. Antibody Test versus Virus Test. In general, there are two types of tests on infection, one is
an antibody test, and the other is a virus test (also referred to as the PCR test). Unfortunately, in
many datasets, the type of reported tests is not specified. The virus tested positive population is
infected at the moment and suggested to be quarantined to avoid infecting others. Meanwhile, the
antibody tested positive population must have been exposed to the virus, but there is no indication
of whether they are still infectious or recovered (The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2020). In addition, the antibody tests are known to be much less accurate. Mixing these
two tests make positive cases uninterpretable. Some states and counties have started to separate
antibody tests from virus tests (Madrigal and Meyer, 2020), while states such as Pennsylvania,
Texas, Georgia, and Vermont did not specify the type of tests.
2.2 Comparison of the Time Series from Different Sources
In this subsection, we discuss a measure to assess the similarity of the time series of the reported cases
collected from different sources. Let K be the number of all available sources in comparison, so for
the county level comparison, K = 3 since the USAFacts does not have county level data, while for the
state level, K = 4. Let T be the number of days observed, or the length of each time series. Let n
be the number of counties or states. For source k, k = 1, . . . ,K, let Y (k)it be the cumulative number
of the reported cases of location i on day t, where i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T . In the following, we
define a dissimilarity measure to assess the difference between two time series: Y(k)i = {Y (k)it }Tt=1
and Y(k
′)
i = {Y (k
′)
it }Tt=1, for any 1 ≤ k 6= k′ ≤ K. Let Y it = K−1
∑K
k=1 Y
(k)
it , then the difference
betweenY(k)i andY
(k′)
i is defined as:
d(k, k′) ≡ d(Y(k)i ,Y(k
′)
i ) :=
 1T ‖Y
(k)
i −Y(k
′)
i ‖/Y iT , Y iT > 0
0, Y iT = 0
, (1)
where Y iT is used as the denominator to mitigate the variability of the current observed counts. By
taking the L2-norm and dividing by the number of days observed, we obtain a measurement that ef-
fectively detects the counties and states with the most discrepancy between each pair of sources, and
5also is meaningful in the comparison between different locations. In Fig. 1 we present the county map
for infected and death counts collected from three different data sources. In Fig. 2 & 3 we present the
state map for infected and death counts collected from four different data sources. Areas in dark blue
in these three figures are detected to be different between the corresponding pair of two sources. Next,
we look further into the underlying reasons for the dissimilarity at the county level and state level.
In Tables 2 and 3, for each pair of sources, we present the counties that are most dissimilar. For
the state of New York, the difference between sources is caused by different geographical assignments.
NYT and JHU combine Kings, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond counties with New York City while At-
lantic does not perform the combination. For the state of Utah, JHU combines counties to jurisdictions
to be consistent with the official state source, while NYT and Atlantic provides county level data. For
the states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the official county-level data is subject to frequent
adjustments, which leads to discrepancies when one source corrects the errors while the other source
does not.
Table 2: Top 10 counties with the largest value of the dissimilarity measure of the infectious
counts between pairs of sources.
NYT vs JHU NYT vs Atlantic JHU vs Atlantic
Dukes, MA Valdez-Cordova, AK Nantucket, MA
Nantucket, MA Wayne, IN Bronx, NY
BoxElder, UT Ontonagon, MI Kings, NY
Duchesne, UT Jackson, MO Queens, NY
Garfield, UT Otero, NM Richmond, NY
Kane, UT Bronx, NY Duchesne, UT
Millard, UT Kings, NY Kane, UT
Morgan, UT New York, NY Millard, UT
Sevier, UT Queens, NY Morgan, UT
Pepin, WI Richmond, NY Pepin, WI
Next, we look into the state level dissimilarity. According to our measure, states that show the dis-
similarity from at least two pairs of sources include Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mon-
tana, New York, Washington, Wyoming, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and
California. For state infected counts, Wyoming has the noisiest data, resulting from sources jumping
significantly at different dates. This is due to the change of rule in including probable cases. Different
sources make varied efforts in revising historical records. To our best knowledge, NYT traces back the
longest history for the probable infected in Wyoming. In Michigan, Atlantic reports higher infectious
counts in April, systematically higher than the other three sources and the state official website, which
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Figure 1: County maps of the dissimilarity measure (left: infected, right: death). (a)-(b) NYT
vs JHU. (c)-(d) NYT vs USAFacts. (e)-(f) JHU vs USAFacts.
7Table 3: Top 10 counties with the largest value of dissimilarity measure of the death counts
between pairs of sources.
NYT vs JHU NYT vs Atlantic JHU vs Atlantic
Crawford, IN Dukes, MA Nantucket, MA
Clark, KS Nantucket, MA Antrim, MI
Dukes, MA Allegany, NY Bronx, NY
Allegany, NY Lewis, NY Cortland, NY
Delaware, NY Queens, NY Lewis, NY
Seneca, NY Lewis, NY Queens, NY
Tompkins, NY Tompkins, NY Seneca, NY
Davison, SD Davison, SD Dallam, TX
Dallam, Texas Iron, UT Iron, UT
Washington, UT Washington, UT Washington, UT
we think Atlantic did adjustment for a specific period. In Indiana, NYT started to report probably
infected cases in late April. Therefore the infectious count of Indiana is higher than the other sources.
2.3 Abnormal Data Detection
Except for the issues mentioned above in the raw data collection, we observe three types of abnor-
malities in the data, including (i) order dependencies violation, (ii) delayed-reported issue on week-
end/holiday, and (iii) abnormal data point or data period. Examples of these issues are illustrated in
Fig. 4. One might need to clean and repair these issues before doing the analysis.
Order Dependencies Violation. Order dependency (OD) is widely used in the relational database.
In this project, we incorporate this concept into the abnormal data detection and data repairing process
of cumulative time series. To be more specific, OD for the cumulative time series can be defined
as follows: for any two time points, t1 and t2, if t1 < t2, then Yt1 ≤ Yt2 , where Y represents the
cumulative infection/death count. Obviously, the time series in Fig. 4 (a) violates the OD.
Weekend Delay-Reported Issue. Weekend delay-reported issue refers to the situation signifi-
cantly fewer daily new cases are reported on weekends, or Fridays and/or Mondays. See Fig. 4 (b) for
an example. This effect is very prevalent at both state and county levels. We use wo function in the R
package seastests (Ollech, 2019) to test the intra-week seasonality.
Abnormal Data Point or Data Period. A single anomaly point refers to the situation where
there is one day of an abrupt increase in the cumulative time series, as shown in Fig. 4 (c). This can
have multiple causes, including (1) the result of a large batch of tests was released; (2) the change of
reporting standard, e.g., some states started to report probable cases from a specific date. Sometimes,
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Figure 2: State maps of the dissimilarity measure (left: infected, right: death). (a)-(b) NYT vs
JHU. (c)-(d) NYT vs USAFacts. (e)-(f) JHU vs USAFacts.
we may experience a continuous abnormal period, referred to as the period where the increasing speed
is significantly different from the previous and the subsequent period. Since this type of abnormal data
could be a change of pattern in time series, we will only provide a warning message once detected. Note
both the single abnormal point and the continuous abnormal period share are essentially the change
point problem in time series. We apply the R package segmented (Muggeo, 2019) to detect the
structural change.
The data curation workflow is illustrated in Fig. 5. Once raw data is collected, we start with the OD
violation detection and repairing. Next, we check for delayed-reporting issues on the weekend/holiday
and let the user decide whether to repair it. Last, we check for the abnormal data point and data period.
If an abnormal data point/period is detected, we suggest to check it manually first and then decide the
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Figure 3: State maps of the dissimilarity measure (left: infected, right: death). (a)-(b) NYT vs
Atlantic. (c)-(d) JHU vs Atlantic. (e)-(f) USAFacts vs Atlantic.
method of repairing.
2.4 Abnormal Data Repairing
First of all, the infection and death count can be considered as count time series by nature. Therefore,
when repairing for count time series, we need to take into account that the observations are nonnegative
integers, and we should utilize the dependence structure among observations. Furthermore, in the
study of the infectious disease, the population is usually assigned to compartments such as Susceptible
(S), Infectious (I), or Recovered (R), and people may progress between compartments. Therefore,
different compartments are usually considered as an entire system and studied together, for example,
the SIR model (Brauer et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2016; Pfeiffer et al., 2008). Third, the spread of
10
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Figure 4: Abnormal data characterizations. (a) Order dependency. (b) Weekend delay-
reported issue. (c) Single abnormal point.
the disease also has a spatial pattern. In this section, we propose data repairing methods to handle the
issues mentioned in the above three categories. In this following, we summarize the background of
these methods and give details on the implementation of the repairing procedure. All of these repairing
procedures can be easily implemented in various areas whenever the variable is the number of events
occurs observed over time, for instance, the daily number of hospital admissions, the number of stock
market transactions, as well as the number of defected components from industrial engineering.
• Time Series Model for Count Data. One of the conventional methods to deal with these chal-
lenges is the generalized linear model (GLM), which models the observations conditionally on
the past information. In this project, we consider both Poisson and Negative Binomial as the
conditional distribution. The second important class for analyzing count time series is the inte-
ger autoregressive moving average (INARMA) models, and a comprehensive review is given by
Weiß (2008). State-space is another type of count time series models. Comparing with the GLM,
it allows a more flexible data generating process. However, it requires a more complicated model
specification. Due to the explicit formulation, the GLM-based models yield a more convenient
way in predictions. Thus, in this project, we focus on the GLM-based method.
We denote Yt the infection or death count at time t. To repair the dataset, we model the condi-
tional mean µt = E(Yt|Yt−1, µt−1) in the following form
νt = β0 +
p∑
k=1
βkYt−k +
q∑
l=1
αlνt−l,
where νt = log (µt).
For this type of data repairing, we use the R package tscount (Liboschik et al., 2020), which
conduct the model estimation by the quasi-conditional maximum likelihood method (function
tsglm).
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Figure 5: Data curation flowchart.
• Combined Linear and Exponential Predictors (CLEP) (Altieri et al., 2020). This method
assembles the following three different models:
1. An individual county exponential predictor: model (2) uses a series of separate predictors
for each county to capture the reported exponential growth of COVID-19 cases and deaths,
and we assume
log {E(Yit|t)} = βi0 + βi1t, t = 1, . . . , 5, (2)
where the parameters βi0 and βi1 are the coefficients for county i in the generalized linear
model (GLM) using glm function in R with a Poisson link function.
2. An individual county linear predictor: model (3) fits a linear version of the separate county
predictors, as shown in the following:
E(Yit|t) = βi0 + βi1t. (3)
3. An individual county exponential epidemic predictor: model (4) uses a series of disease
related factor for each county to capture the reported exponential growth of COVID-19
cases and deaths.
log {E(Yit|Yi,t−1)} = βi0 + βi1 log (Yi,t−1 + 1). (4)
• Spatio-Temporal Epidemic Model (STEM). Based on the idea of the SIR models, L Wang,
G Wang, L Gao, X Li, S Yu, M Kim, Y Wang, Z Gu (2020) proposed the discrete-time spatial
12
epidemic model which combines the infected state, susceptible state and removed state together.
In the following, we denote Iit, Dit, and Rit the count in infected, death and recovered states in
location i and time stamp t, respectively. We assume that the conditional mean value of daily
new positive cases (Iit), fatal cases (Dit) and recovery (Rit) can be modeled via a link function
g as follows:
g(µIi,t) = β
I
0t(loni, lati) + β
I
1t(loni, lati) log (Ii,t−1),
g(µDi,t) = β
D
0t(loni, lati) + β
D
1t(loni, lati) log (Ii,t−1),
µRi,t = β
R
0t + β
R
1tIi,t−1.
In practice, we use the bivariate spline over triangulation to approximate the spatially varying co-
efficient functions, β0t(loni, lati) and β1t(loni, lati). The triangulation can be obtained through
various software packages; see for example, the Matlab code DistMesh, and the R package
Triangulation (Wang and Lai, 2019). Based on a triangulation, the bivariate spline basis
can be generated via the R package BPST (Wang et al., 2019). The entire estimation procedure
is completed using a quasi-likelihood approach via the penalized spline approximation and an
iteratively reweighted least-squares technique; see details in L Wang, G Wang, L Gao, X Li, S
Yu, M Kim, Y Wang, Z Gu (2020).
2.5 Code availability
For public usage, a Github repository at https://github.com/covid19-dashboard-us/
cdcar has been established. A copy of the cleaned data set starting from January 22, 2020, has also
been included in the R package cdcar. A live version of the data analysis will be continually updated
on our dashboard at https://covid19.stat.iastate.edu.
3 Data Records
We collect the epidemic data up to county level in the U.S. along with control measures and other local
information, such as socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics, healthcare infrastructure, and
other essential factors to analyze the spatiotemporal dynamic pattern of the spread of COVID-19. Our
data covers about 3,200 county-equivalent areas from 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. The
sources and introductions for these data are detailed in Table 4.
I. Epidemic Data The daily counts of cases and deaths of COVID-19 are crucial for understanding
how this pandemic is spreading. Using the algorithm discussed in the section of methods, we aggregate
the reported COVID-19 infected, death, and recovered cases from January 22, 2020 from (1) the NYT
(NYT, 2020a), (2) the Atlantic (Atlantic, 2020), (3) the COVID-19 Data Repository from the JHU
(CSSE, 2020), and (4) the USAFacts (USAFacts, 2020). These daily updated epidemic datasets are
available on Github repository https://github.com/covid19-dashboard-us/cdcar.
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Table 4: Sources of datasets.
Data Type Source
COVID-19 Related Time-series
Infections Data Atlantic (2020); CSSE (2020);
NYT (2020a); USAFacts (2020)
Fatality Data Atlantic (2020); CSSE (2020);
NYT (2020a); USAFacts (2020)
Recovery Data Atlantic (2020)
Dates of COVID-19 Related Policies
Declarations of State Emergency 1Point3Acres (2020)
Shelter-in-place or Stay-at-home Order NYT (2020b)
American Community Survey (ACS) Data
2010-2018 Demographic and Housing Estimates U.S. Census Bureau (2018)
2005-2009 ACS 5-year Estimates U.S. Census Bureau (2010a)
2012 Economic Census U.S. Census Bureau (2012)
2010 U.S. Decennial Census U.S. Census Bureau (2010b)
Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-level Data U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (2020)
USA Counties Database U.S. Census Bureau (2011)
U.S. Census Bureau Gazetteer Files U.S. Census Bureau (2019)
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In the state level epidemic data, we include the following variables. Among those variables, the variable
State can be used as the key for data merge.
1. State – Name of state. There are the 48 mainland U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
2. XYYYY.MM.DD – Cumulative infection or death cases related to the date of YYYY.MM.DD.
YYYY, MM, and DD represent year, month and day, respectively. It starts from X2020.01.22.
For example, the variable X2020.01.22 is either infection or death cases in a certain state (State)
on 01/22/2020.
For county-level data, two more county-specific variables are included. As the key of this table, variable
ID can be used for future data merge.
1. ID – County-level Federal Information Processing System (FIPS) code, which uniquely identi-
fies the geographic area. The number has five digits, of which the first two are the FIPS code of
the state to which the county belongs.
2. County – Name of county matched with ID. There are about 3,200 counties and county-equivalents
(e.g. independent cities, parishes, boroughs) in the U.S.
3. State – Name of state matched with ID. There are 50 states and the District of Columbia in the
U.S.
4. XYYYY.MM.DD – Cumulative infection or death cases related to the date of YYYY.MM.DD.
YYYY, MM, and DD represent year, month and day, respectively. It starts from X2020.01.22.
For example, the variable X2020.01.22 is either infection or death cases in a certain (County)
on 01/22/2020.
II. Other Factors. When analyzing the reported cases of COVID-19, many other factors may also
be responsible for temporal or spatial patterns. For example, local features, like socioeconomic and
demographic factors, can dramatically influence the course of the epidemic, and thus, the spread of the
disease could vary dramatically across different geographical regions. Therefore, these data are also
supplemented with the population information at the county level in our repository. We further classify
these factors into six groups.
II.1. State-level policy data. To combat the coronavirus outbreak, the government introduced various
control measures. Government declarations are used to identify the dates that different jurisdictions
implemented various social distancing policies (emergency declarations, school closures, bans on large
gatherings, limits on bars, restaurants and other public places, the deployment of severe travel restric-
tions, and “stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders). President Trump declared a state of emergency
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on March 13, 2020, to enhance the federal government response to confront the COVID-19. By March
16, 2020, every state had made an emergency declaration. Since then, more severe social distancing
actions have been taken by most of the states, especially those hardest hit by the pandemic.
Since the late April, all 50 states in the U.S. began to reopen successively, due to the immense
pressures of the crippled economy and anxious public. A state is categorized as “reopening” once its
stay-at-home order lifts, or once reopening is permitted in at least one primary sector (restaurants, retail
stores, personal care businesses), or once reopening is permitted in a combination of smaller sectors.
We compiled the dates of executive orders by checking national and state governmental websites, news
articles, and press releases.
II.2. Demographic Characteristics. In the demographic characteristics category, we consider the
factors describing racial, ethnic, sexual, and age structures. Specifically, we include the following six
variables. Among these six variables, AA PCT and HL PCT are obtained from the 2010 Census
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). The other four variables are extracted from the 2010–2018 American
Community Survey (ACS) Demographic and Housing Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
1. AA PCT – the percent of the population who identify as African American;
2. HL PCT – the percent of the population who identify as Hispanic or Latino;
3. Old PCT – the percent of aged people (age ≥ 65 years);
4. Sex ratio – the ratio of male over female;
5. PD log – the logarithm of the population density per square mile of land area;
Pop log – the logarithm of local population.
6. Mortality – the 5-year (1998-2002) average mortality rate, measured by the total counts of
deaths per 100, 000 population in a county;
II.3. Healthcare Infrastructure. We incorporated three features related to the healthcare infrastruc-
ture at the county level in the datasets. Among these variables, NHIC PCT is available in the USA
Counties Database (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), EHPC is obtained from Economic Census 2012 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2012), and TBed is compiled from Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-level Data
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).
1. NHIC PCT – the percent of persons under 65 years without health insurance;
2. EHPC – the local government expenditures for health per capita;
3. TBed – total bed counts per 1, 000 population.
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II.4. Socioeconomic Status. We consider diverse socioeconomic factors in the county level datasets.
All of these factors collected from 2005–2009 ACS 5-year estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). We
also calculate the Gini coefficient based on the household income data from the 2005–2009 ACS (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2010a) to measure the income inequality.
1. Affluence – social affluence generated by factor analysis from HighIncome, HighEducation,
WCEmployment and MedHU;
2. HIncome PCT – the percent of families with annual incomes higher than $75,000;
3. HEducation PCT – the percent of the population aged 25 years or older with a bachelor’s degree
or higher;
4. MedHU – the median value of owner-occupied housing units;
5. Disadvantage – concentrated disadvantage obtained by factor analysis from HHD PAI PCT,
HHD F PCT and Unemployment PCT;
6. HHD PAI PCT – the percent of the households with public assistance income;
7. HHD F PCT – the percent of households with female householders and no husband present;
8. Unemployment PCT – civilian labor force unemployment rate;
9. Gini – the Gini coefficient, a measure for income inequality and wealth distribution in eco-
nomics.
II.5. Environmental Factor. Another category of factors in the literature that affects the spread of
epidemics significantly is the environmental factor, such as the urban rate and crime rate.
1. UrbanRate – urban rate (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b);
2. ViolentCrime – the total number of violent crimes per 1, 000 population (U.S. Census Bureau,
2011);
3. PropertyCrime – the total number of property crimes per 1, 000 population (U.S. Census Bu-
reau, 2011);
4. ResidStability – the percent of the population residence in the same house for one year and over
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b).
III. Geographic Information. The longitude and latitude of the geographic center for each county in
the U.S. are available in Gazetteer Files from U.S. Census Bureau (2019).
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Technical Validation
The entire detection and repairing procedure is illustrated in Figure 5. First of all, we obtained the data
from all of the four data sources, and use the dissimilarity measure proposed in the above to compare
them. We visualize and check the difference at the state level among different data sources based on
the comparison results. For the county-level data, we calculate the measure and reported the top 10
counties, which are the most different pairwisely. Then, all the data are processed with all types of
abnormal detection discussed in the section of abnormal data detection. Once an abnomality has been
detected, a warning will be given automatically by R package cdcar. We handle the abnormal data
differently depends on the type of problem. For example, if an order dependency violation is detected,
we will repair that point using our data repairing algorithms. If a single abnormal point is detected, we
first manually check possible legitimate reasons based on news and social media. If no such information
can be found, we will repair the point using the proposed algorithm.
Usage Notes
The integrated data are publicly available to assist researchers to investigate the spread of COVID-
19 in the U.S. We will continue to provide the cleaned data as the pandemic progresses. Both the
R package and the datasets discussed in this article is hosted on our GitHub repository: https:
//github.com/covid19-dashboard-us/cdcar.
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